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Philosophy of science and history of science were not so closely 
related in the past precisely because the problem of discovery was 
either thrown away or made an appendage to the problem of 
justification. This paper makes an attempt to explicate the complex 
interaction between the problem of discovery and history and 
philosophy of science, including its bearing on scientific practice. 
Post-positivist and anti-positivist critical discourses in philosophy of 
science totally disturbed the orthodox and established disciplines of 
knowledge and radically transformed our understanding about 
science, scientific knowledge and the context of scientific discovery. 
Understanding the significance of the problem of discovery to history 
and philosophy of science enables us to arrive at an adequate theory 
of science as a cognitive inquiry and creative human endeavor. The 
central argument in this paper is to drive home the point that the 
contemporary debates on problem of discovery can shed new light on 
the central issues of history and philosophy of science, and most 
importantly on the nature of scientific rationality.  
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The re-orientation which philosophy of science underwent in the 
beginning of the second half of twentieth century was both cause 
and effect of a renewed interest in the problem of discovery 
(Schickore J and F Steinle, 2006). As Thomas Nickles (1980, 
2017) points out,  
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“The most important, general reason for the revival of 
interest in discovery surely has been philosophers’ 
increased concern in the past two decades with real science 
and historical cases. Critical reaction to Arthur Koestler’s 
The Sleepwalkers, published in 1959, a year after the 
appearance of Norwood Russell Hanson’s Patterns of 
Discovery, helped to pique philosophers’ interest both in 
the history of science and in the discovery process.”  
 
The subsequent works of Thomas Kuhn (1970, 1979) and Paul 
Feyerabend (1987, 1988, 1991) further promoted the interest in 
discovery. However it should be noted that the interest in discovery 
was not simply the result of the historic-sociological orientation of 
philosophy of science, but also the cause of the latter.  
The interest in the problem of discovery is replacing the very 
central terms in which philosophy of science has been seeking to 
provide the account of science and its rationale. Wartofsky’s (1980) 
words in this connection are only an index of the direction in which 
such a change is taking place. According to him the philosophical 
consideration of discovery has necessitated  
“a fundamental category shift. Because discovery in 
science is an epistemological question, i.e., one concerning 
scientific knowledge, and indeed, the genesis of such 
knowledge, the shift that is needed is one in the 
epistemological categories in terms of which philosophy of 
science studies or understands scientific thought” 
(Wartofsky,1980).  
 
According to Wartofsky, in dealing with the question of 
scientific creativity which is central to the problem of discovery, 
we must invoke a neglected epistemological category, namely 
‘Scientific judgment’ which must replace the dominant 
epistemological category in the contemporary philosophy of 
science, namely, scientific explanation. In the same vein, 
Finocchiaro (1980) attempts to replace knowledge by 
understanding as the central category in understanding science. 
In this connection he says:  
“It (our understanding of scientific discovery) is one which 
would replace knowledge and search for truth as the key 
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explanatory concepts by those of understanding and 
problem-solving” (Finocchiaro,1980).  
 
The most important point about the contentions of 
Wartofsky and Finocchiaro is the contrast between explanation 
and judgment in the case of the former and knowledge and 
understanding in case of the latter. This crucial distinction is 
reminiscent of Von Wright’s (1971) contrast between explanation 
and understanding. Such a category-shift will immediately 
distance our construal of scientific thought from not only the 
customary view of science as made up of deductively structured 
theories with their progressive approximation to truth but also 
the time-honored view of knowledge-claims including scientific 
knowledge-claims as true justified beliefs.  
The problem of scientific rationality has been the central 
issue in philosophy of science. The positivists attempted to 
construe and defend the idea of scientific rationality in terms of 
their notions of pure observation and quasi-deductive ways in 
which the theoretical superstructure of science was supposed to 
be related to the indubitable observational basis. Popper gave a 
better theory of scientific rationality in terms of his ideas of 
criticism and falsification. It must be noted that these ideas of 
scientific rationality failed to take into account many factors that 
play an active role in actual scientific practice. The reasons for 
this poverty were the rejection of the phenomenon of discovery 
as a philosophically irrelevant aspect of scientific thought. The 
most important of such factors are the supposedly extra-scientific 
considerations that pertain to certain metaphysical ideas.  
It may be noted that such a notion of rationality is basically 
ahistorical. This is obvious since both positivists and Popper 
construed a philosophical account of science in terms of a set of 
logically articulable logical rules. Anything that is not available 
or amenable to such a logistics articulation, was considered  
to be non-rational and hence irrelevant to a philosophical 
understanding of science. They were considered to be at best 
external factors as distinct from internal ones, which are 
intrinsically tailored to the terms of representation allowed by 
the program of logical reconstruction. As Stefan Amsterdamski 
(1975) so aptly puts it,  
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“if, however, we treat science as a part of the intellectual 
culture of a given historical period, then the division  
of history into ‘internal’ and ‘external’ appears totally 
artificial and arbitrary. The essence of the development of 
science is then determined not only by its logic, but also by 
elements and factors, which lie outside the sphere of logic. 
What…. appears as pathological, unnatural and irrational 
from such a perspective appears as natural. Metaphysics, 
myths or superstitions are in some manner as immanently a 
part of science as the facts which we attempt to include into 
the rational reconstruction.”   
In this context, it is imperative to recall Isaac Newton, whose 
commitment to the Cartesian metaphysics compelled him to 
reject the idea of gravity as an ultimate principle not needing 
further explanation. It may also be noted that Newton opposed 
Huygen’s wave theory of light and insisted upon the acceptance 
of corpuscular theory because of his metaphysical commitment 
to atomism. It was not, nor did Newton believe, that the 
corpuscular theory had better empirical support. After all, when 
Robert Young in 1801 successfully replaced Newton’s theory by 
a somewhat altered version of Huygen’s theory he confessed that 
he did not possess any more experimental evidence than the  
ones Newton himself worked out. The fact that it is the same 
empirical basis which was invoked to support the two divergent 
theses shows that Newton’s espousal of his theory was rooted in 
something more than empirical i.e., evidential matters.  
Some more examples can further strengthen Amsterdamski’s 
view. In his remarkable essay, ‘The Legitimation of Scientific 
belief: Theory Justification by Copernicus’, Bruce Wrightsman 
convincingly shows the role of Copernicus’ theological 
commitments in the formulation of his ideas and the basis for its 
acceptance, at least in the eyes of Copernicus. Commenting on 
Copernicus’ idea of the Sun, the lamp of the universe, as the 
fittest entity to occupy the center of ‘this most beautiful temple’, 
an idea that has close association with the idea of God in Judaic-
Christian tradition, Wrightsman (1980) writes:  
“In the course of his argumentation, a definite pattern  
of reasoning emerges which renders such epitaphs for 
discovery as ‘irrational’ and ‘subjective’ patently 
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inappropriate. One may not like Copernicus’s reasons for 
coming to believe in and justifying his system but that is not 
a rational ground for refusing to accept them as reasons. 
We must therefore remind ourselves that scientific 
investigation had much broader implications for 
Copernicus than it has for many today and included those 
purposes which we classify as religious and extra-
scientific. Such considerations, however, were crucial for 
Copernicus and were demonstrably instrumental for his 
achievement.”  
 
In a similar way, Michael Ruse explains the content of 
Darwinian theory in terms of Darwin’s acceptance of the 
Newtonian paradigm as the methodological ideal and teleology 
as a basic fact of the life-world. The former gets expressed in the 
way in which Darwin casts his arguments in support of Natural 
Selection as well as the very structure of the Origin of Species 
which has “a fan like form, with core of selection explaining  
in so many different areas: biogeography, paleontology, 
embryology, and so forth” (Ruse,1980). All this is in consonance 
with the ‘consilience of inductions’ so well elaborated by 
Herschel and Whewell as an admirable quality of Newton’s 
theory. Darwin’s belief in the teleological world-view was 
undoubtedly a metaphysical belief since the belief in teleology 
however widely shared was not an altogether obvious and self-
evident empirical fact. In this context, Michael Ruse (1980) says,  
“The concern with ends was no less an obsession for 
Darwin than it was for his opponents…. Both in his 
Newtonianism and his Teleology, Darwin let his way of 
discovery influence the theory he produced….In these two 
modes of Newtonianism and Teleology…Darwin 
incorporated subjective elements into his theory of organic 
origins, and ….these elements were a direct function of his 
route to discovery.”  
 
Discovery appears non-rational only if we overlook the 
complex pattern of thought that precedes justification. What 
precedes justification is not simply hitting upon an idea. It 
involves confrontation of a problem, creation of an explanatory 
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hypothesis and hitting upon auxiliary assumptions in conjunction 
with which it yields test-implications (Krajewski, 1981). The 
confrontation of a problem is usually in the form of identifying 
an anomaly and this itself is a rational act. Further, the 
confronted problem needs to be put into a new light whenever 
the old attempts made to solve it prove inadequate. This again is 
a rational act. Creation of an explanatory hypothesis is not 
simply the result of an instantaneous flash.  The scientific 
practitioner must make sure whether such an idea is in harmony 
with other theories, which he doesn’t find fault with. If he finds 
fault with those theories also, the problem becomes deeper in its 
significance and wider in its ramifications. Further, he must 
make sure that the proposed theory is internally consistent. These 
considerations are more palpably present in fundamental i.e., 
theoretical sciences. Lastly, it needs a protracted struggle to 
identify the auxiliary hypothesis without which the proposed 
theory does not yield test implications. If all these steps do not 
call for the role of rational faculty one wonders what rationality 
and rational faculty mean.  
It is true that Karl Popper, who takes an anti-discovery 
stance, very much recognizes the importance of ‘problem’ in the 
gamut of scientific theorizing. In fact, unlike Positivists, he 
considers it to be the starting point of scientific reflection. He 
very rightly recognizes science as an essentially problem-solving 
activity. However, such recognition does not have a functional 
role in his scheme of science. Science, according to him, resides 
in the attempt of falsifying or critically evaluating the 
conjectures. It is this that compels him to relegate all that 
precedes evaluation to the domain of the non-rational. Thus the 
phenomenon of problem-solving, characteristic of science, 
remains in spite of Popper’s formal recognition a neglected area 
of philosophy of science. It is to the credit of the contemporary 
discussion on the problem of scientific discovery that this 
neglected topic is given its due share of attention.  
By pushing the idea of problem-solving to the center of the 
stage, the problem of discovery can bring about a fundamental 
change in the very orientation of philosophy of science, where, 
by and large, ideas of theory and explanation are treated in 
isolation from the problem-context in which the theories and 
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explanations occur. It is such an isolation and abstraction that 
has given rise to the attempts of reducing, philosophically, 
certain concepts to other concepts and certain theories to other 
theories. Though such reductions do occur in the scientific 
practice itself in connection with certain problems, such 
reductions are misleadingly interpreted by philosophers of 
science in epistemological terms thereby rendering their account 
of actual scientific practice not only half-true but even 
misleading (Hesse,1959).  
This discussion points to the need for working out a very 
broad theory of scientific rationality and the central role of the 
problem of discovery in working out such a theory. Such a 
theory of scientific rationality must replace the existing one 
which fails to do justice to the different facets of the thought-
process in science and also is incompatible with the fact that 
most of the times there is a conspicuous absence of consensus in 
the reception of a theory. This should not have been a fact if the 
norms of rationality in science were as cut and dry as believed to 
be by the logical empiricist as well as Popperians who made 
justification the essential stage of scientific thought. Even 
Thomas Kuhn seems to push under the carpet such a recalcitrant 
fact of the absence of consensus when he gives the impression 
that the consensus will ultimately prevail due to the institutional 
framework of science wherein the peers will manage. Such a 
position leaves unanswered many questions. Joseph Agassi 
pinpoints such questions and difficulties, the most important 
being the vicious circle brought about by the situation: How do 
we bring about the consensus?  Through leaders. Who is a 
leader? One who is accepted by consensus? 
An adequate theory of rationality which will make room for 
the wider considerations on the one hand and the frequent 
absence of consensus on the other will be able to locate and 
characterize the creative dimensions of scientific activity without 
compromising time-honored logical values like consistency. In 
the words of I.B. Cohen (1956), “the logic of discovery 
converges on the logic of the discovered”. In her celebrated 
paper ‘Should Philosophers of Science Consider Scientific 
Discovery?’ Elzbieta Pietruska-Madej  puts her finger right on 
the pulse of the issues when she explains the contemporary 
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construal of scientific change as irrational and the failure of 
philosophers like Popper in establishing the rationality of 
scientific change. She traces both of them to the neglect of the 
problem of discovery. The surrender of the study of the process 
by which new scientific knowledge emerges coupled with an 
interest in the dynamics of science has resulted in a paradox. 
Further, Pietruska-Madej says, 
“The growth of scientific knowledge must appear to 
philosophers to be a discontinuous process: the stages 
about which they (as philosophers) have nothing to say 
alternate with those that are the main and proper subject of 
their interest!” 
 
In other words, the predicament of irrationality emanates 
from the apparent phenomenon of discontinuity – the inevitable 
result of the Nihilistic attitude towards scientific discovery. For 
the continuities in science can be established in the domain of 
discovery where new knowledge and old knowledge somehow 
are related in certain ways, which may not be specifiable in 
formal ways. These relations, though not formally articulable, 
are strong enough to establish new knowledge as indispensible 
i.e., as somehow being determined to occur. That is the reason 
why scientists and historians of science speak of certain 
discoveries as historical necessities. That is why it makes sense 
when Medawar (1963) says that if Crick and Watson had not 
discovered the structure of DNA someone else would certainly 
have done so. It is also the case with the eminent historian de 
Solla Price’s (1986) conviction about the discoveries of Boyle 
and Planck. Pietruska-Madej very rightly points out that it is this 
inevitability of the new scientific discovery that can explain 
simultaneous discoveries. The awareness of the relations is part 
of the reflection that constitutes discovery process. Hence a 
study of discovery will go a long way in extricating us from the 
predicament if irrationalism.  
The whole of the preceding discussion was intended to drive 
home the point that the problem of discovery can shed new light 
on the central issue of philosophy of science, namely, the nature 
of scientific rationality, the Nihilistic view towards discovery has 
a naïve and wrong conception of not only the process of 
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discovery but also of justification as well. In the zeal to present 
justification in cut and dry terms, which are amenable to a 
logistic formulation, it fails to make certain crucial distinctions 
between various types of scientific theories. It therefore fails to 
recognize the fact that the various types of scientific theories 
might call for various types of evaluation. For example, the 
phenomenological theories and deep-structure theories might be 
subject to qualitatively different types of evaluation. Similarly, 
some theories might make no reference to ideal conditions/ 
entities whereas others make no sense without postulating them. 
The evaluation process is definitely not the same in the case of 
these fundamentally distinct types of entities. In other words, the 
existence of the degree of complexity resulting from the variety 
of the ontologies of those theories has been totally missed by 
those who construe justification in terms of a logical monolith.   
According to the writings of Worral (1985), Nickles (1985), 
Krajeswski (1981), Leplin (1980), etc., certain types of theories 
whose peculiarities are of paramount theoretical significance 
involve a type of justification in which figure the factors which 
concern discovery and thus obliterating the line between 
discovery and justification. Thus this discussion is sufficient to 
warrant the contention that the picture of science presented by 
the Nihilistic construal of discovery is not just incomplete but 
even distorted. That is to say, the anti-discovery view is guilty 
not only of omissions but also of commissions.  
There is an increasing need felt by philosophers of science to 
bring into relevance history of science in order that their 
professional concern must be related to the real science rather 
than the ‘ideal’ science that exists in the minds of tough-minded 
logicians of science. But it is not at all clear what type of history 
and what amount of history should make entry into the 
philosophical discussion about science. Even Thomas Kuhn 
(1979) who by percept and practice is more than most of other 
philosophers’ enthusiast of history of science has not been able 
to specify the modalities that should govern the relationship 
between history of science and philosophy of science. He almost 
sounds pessimistic when he says that since philosophically 
useful historical accounts of science are too scarce and far 
between it is necessary that philosophers of science themselves 
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should become historians of science. Thus Kuhn has left to 
philosophers of science the difficult task of formulating the 
precise ways in which history of science and philosophy of 
science can be brought together, yet keeping the autonomy and 
integrity of these disciplines intact. This is more easily said than 
done.   
The problem of discovery can successfully work as a point 
of mediation in making historical accounts of science 
philosophically charged and philosophical accounts of science 
historically informed. Larry Laudan (1977), though skeptical of 
the clarity of the demand for bringing history and philosophy of 
science together, agreed that the best possible way of doing so is 
by focusing our attention on the history of methodology of 
science. One can say, whether Laudan agrees or not, that 
methodology mostly concerns not so much about justification in 
the narrow sense of testing but the norms that decide, in however 
loose a way, the terms of acceptance and these in turn have a lot 
to do with discovery. It may be worth mentioning here that 
philosophy of science and history of science were not so closely 
related in the past precisely because the problem of discovery 
was either thrown away or made an appendage to the problem of 
justification. This reveals the significance of the problem of 
discovery for history of science.  
It is often emphasized that science education must not 
present science as a repository of formulae but as a human 
activity with an essential historical dimension. That is to say, 
science education must present science in a dynamic rather than 
a static mold. But obviously mere presentation of historical facts 
in a chronological order does not in itself constitute a historical 
perspective. The question, then, is what would be a fertile history 
of science that can equip a student with a historical perspective? 
By and large, the available histories of science, whenever they 
are accessible to a student of science, would be found lacking in 
terms of providing a perspective.  
A serious study of the phenomenon of discovery can 
contribute to finding terms for historical narrative that can 
possess both philosophical richness as well as pedagogical 
utility. It must be admitted that, unlike in general history, history 
of science could have had simple patterns of explanation since  
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“scientists appear to be engaged in a more orderly and 
rational activity than those involved in politics, waging 
wars, or molding social institutions. However, there is one 
crucial aspect of science, which seems particularly 
recalcitrant to analysis, namely, the process of discovery” 
(Koertge, 1980). 
In what follows, a very brief discussion on how the problem 
of discovery can bring out the significance of history of science 
to science-studies and how it can make history of science 
capable of being very relevant is discussed. 
The problem of discovery enables the historians of science to 
identify and explain certain important phenomena in the history 
of science. These concerns are what are called simultaneous 
discoveries and also aborted discoveries. Historical accounts of 
science that only chronicle successful discoveries and concentrate 
only on empirical ratification of theories cannot even recognize 
these phenomena, let alone explain them. It is in this context one 
needs to make a reference to simultaneous discoveries and also 
how certain discoveries have a determinate character.  
The simultaneous discoveries in science are too large in number 
to be dismissed as accidental. This is because as  de Solla Price 
(1986) points out, one can get the impression that every fact and 
every theory were lying waiting to be discovered and when their 
time came these ideas got discovered by several competing people 
(Koertge, 1980). The occurrence of simultaneous discoveries, in 
other words, is made possible by the fact that the seeds of those 
discoveries pre-exist in a manner that the occurrences are 
determined. These seeds exist in the previously existing knowledge. 
Hence a discovery that is simultaneously made must be understood 
in terms of its relations with the old knowledge. The understanding 
of those relations is made possible by taking up the problem of 
discovery. For it is in the context of discovery that those relations 
reside. To be more precise, they exist in the relations that concern 
the structure of the problems and the character of the background 
knowledge. As Burian (1980) points out,  
“It is the definiteness of problem structure and of the shifts 
in that structure when the background knowledge changes 
which account for many of the notorious cases of 
simultaneous discovery.”  
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Though history of science as a discipline has not overlooked 
the discovery problem, the problem has not been handled with 
the analytical tools that are indispensible for understanding the 
conceptual layers of the problematic. Mere presentation of facts, 
figures, data and biographical information are not sufficient  
for such understanding. The second phenomenon of aborted 
discovery occurs quite often. Note that these are not falsified 
theories but those that are made too soon. As Pietruska Madej 
(1985) puts it,  
“These are discoveries which are made, but which are 
then completely disregarded by science. What is mysterious 
here is the fact that science often fails to adopt an idea of 
genius, but then rediscovers it years later. How then do we 
explain the failure of such ‘discoveries’? If we consider the 
essence of scientific discovery to be a matter if invention 
alone, we cannot answer this. We answer it when we note that 
there are some objective reasons in science that make the idea 
in question superfluous or unnecessary, reasons either built 
into the body of science or disconnected from it.” 
 
A consideration of the problem of discovery facilitates a 
proper understanding of what an explanation ought to be in 
history of science. It is very difficult to find adequate 
explanations in most of the historical accounts and it is 
undoubtedly true that the objects of historians’ inquiry are too 
complex to be woven into a neat pattern. The advice of some 
philosophers like Carl G. Hempel (1966) to historians to adopt 
the Deductive-Nomological Model of explanation is absolutely 
wrong-headed. Not only is it doubtful whether the D-N Model 
fits explanation in Natural science, but also, even if it does, there 
no reason why it should be extended to history. 
It may be, in fact it is, the case that historical understanding 
has an integrity and uniqueness, which makes it sui generis. The 
absence of covering laws in historical narrative makes the 
proposal all the more precarious. Since the available models of 
historical explanation are unacceptable it is necessary for the 
historians to go in search of their own alternative. Philosophers 
of history, like William Dray (1957), have gone a long way in 
doing so. Their work underpins the need to explain human 
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actions in terms of the norms and reasons as they make sense to 
the agents. The historian of science must seek similar entities in 
his explanation of the historical events – achievements and 
failure.  
Given the obvious fact that the empirical justifications in 
terms of verification or falsification are straightforward acts the 
complexity that characterizes scientific events must be traced to 
the context of discovery (Howard 2006; Richardson 2006). 
Protracted interest in the texture of discoveries constituted by the 
problem-situation and the constraints and options opened will 
facilitate the stabilization of the conception of rational 
explanation that fits the professional concerns of the historian of 
science. It is only by developing such a theory of explanation 
that the historian of science can steer clear of descriptivist 
barrenness and deductivist dogma.  
The question of wholesomeness of historical explanation so 
far as science of history is concerned has often been a bone of 
contention. This question concerns historiography of science. 
The purist historiography exclusively concentrates on the so-
called internal factors. These internal factors are supposed to 
cover those considerations, which make science a cognitive 
system. As against this position it is more and more emphasized 
today that an adequate historical account of science must 
recognize the primacy of external factors, which include the 
social, the political, the economic and the cultural dimensions of 
the historical context in which science as an institution exists and 
develops. However, it is obvious that an adequate historiography 
should not only take into account both the factors but also must 
seek to work out an analytical model that specifies the relative 
importance of these factors. 
If one looks at the use of the word ‘internal factor’ by the 
internalists, one sees that the word is used in too narrow a sense. 
It may be noted that most of the internalists are of positivist or 
quasi-positivist persuasion. Being Nihilists in connection with 
the problem of discovery they exhaust their story of science  
in terms of empirical justification and it is this empirical 
justification that is considered to be the central internal factor. 
As a description of historical facts about science this picture is 
absolutely wrong. Innumerable examples can be given where 
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scientific theories are accepted without adequate empirical 
justification and rejected in spite of pretty strong empirical 
support. The example of Joanne’s falsifying Aristotle’s Law of 
falling bodies nearly one thousand years before Galileo and 
Simon Stevin’s successful attempt to disprove the same law one 
hundred years before Galileo, are sufficient to support the latter 
point. So far as the former point is concerned, it may be noted 
that the Copernican view did not outmatch the old view in terms 
of its empirical support. In fact the conclusively superior 
empirical support, the Copernican view got nearly two hundred 
years after its acceptance in the form of the pendulum 
experiment.  
The above-mentioned considerations have led some 
philosophers to distinguish between justifications on the one 
hand and validation or acceptance on the other. The latter is 
supposed to be broad in the sense that it includes apart from 
empirical success matters like conformity with the metaphysical 
commitments, methodological stands and value commitments of 
the society. It may be noted that these factors are germane to the 
process of discovery. From this it does not follow that every 
discoverer is aware of them and sticks to them during the process 
of discovery. But from this it does follow that what goes on 
before justification has nothing to do with these factors.  
From the above discussion one can infer that an adequate 
historiography must have a wider construal of internality and 
such a construal should be related to the phenomenon of 
discovery. It is only then that we will be able to bring out the 
complexity of the internal factors. Such a broad construal might 
even obliterate the line between the external factors and the 
internal factors and thus facilitate a unitary historiographical 
framework, which brings home the point that when we 
investigate discovery we are investigating  
“not a timeless structure like deduction but rather an event 
subject to the historian’s skills, one about which the first 
and most appropriate questions to be asked are historian’s 
questions”(McMullin, 1980).  
Such a history of science can be creative by being re-
creative. In this context Agassi (1981) says,  
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“The restriction on our conception of science imposes a 
severe restriction on our internal historiography of science, 
which consequently prevents us from recreating the past of 
science as freely as we recreate the past of literature.”  
 
Thus the addition of the discovery-dimension to history of 
science is nothing more than the addition of historical dimension 
to discovery. It is this, which can make history of science 
relevant to philosophy of science and also can provide modalities 
and guidelines to a creative relation between them.  
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